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This paper is concerned with the phenomenological repercussions of being positioned 
within widely available social constructions of cancer. Being diagnosed with cancer can 
constitute a challenge because it requires the person to make sense of the diagnosis and to 
find meaning in their changed circumstances. From a social constructionist point of view, 
such meaning is made out of discursive resources which are available within one’s 
culture. This paper reviews some of the dominant discourses surrounding cancer which 
are available within English-speaking Western Industrialised cultures. It maps out the 
discursive positions available to those diagnosed with cancer and it traces some of their 
implications for how cancer can be experienced and how it may be lived with. The paper 
reflects on the relationship between discourse and phenomenology, arguing that in order 
to fully appreciate the experience of a cancer diagnosis we need to be aware of the 













In an earlier paper (Willig, 2009) I reflected on the process of meaning-making during 
the process of being diagnosed with cancer. In this earlier paper I described my own 
experience of the process of attempting to construct and maintain a serviceable narrative 
that made sense of what was happening to me in the midst of emotional turmoil and 
uncertainty. I reflected on the experience of being thrown into a new and unsettling 
discursive universe and the consequences of this for my experience of myself and my 
relationships with other people. One of the key points I made in the paper was that upon 
being diagnosed with cancer I quickly realised that not all available ways of making 
sense of my experience were helpful to me. I also noticed that during a time when I was 
still searching for meaning in my experience, other people’s comments on my situation 
(and the meanings around cancer which they invoked) could be extremely unsettling for 
me. It felt as though I had to work hard to resist and hold at bay proffered meanings 
which, to me, seemed unhelpful or even destructive.       
 
In this present paper, I build upon, but also move beyond, my own experience. I aim to 
map out the discursive positions available to those diagnosed with cancer and to trace 
some of their implications for how cancer can be experienced and lived with. As such, 
this paper is concerned with the social and psychological consequences of being 
positioned within some of the dominant discourses associated with cancer diagnosis in 
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contemporary  English speaking Western Industrialised cultures such as those found in 
the United Kingdom, the USA, Australia and New Zealand.  
 
 
The Role of Diagnosis 
 
Jutel (2009: 278) argues that “[D]iagnosis is (…) a powerful social tool, with unique 
features and impacts which deserve their own specific analysis”. She observes that  
research into the social processes associated with diagnosis has explored the place of 
diagnosis in the institution of medicine, the social framing of disease definitions, the 
means by which diagnosis confers authority on medicine, and how that authority is 
challenged. In this paper, I am concerned with the effects of a medical diagnosis beyond 
the clinic. I focus on how a medical diagnosis positions the patient in relation to ‘healthy’  
others in society rather than in relation to medical professionals which appears to be a 
more common focus in social research in this area (see Blaxter, 2009 and Jutel, 2009 for 
reviews of such literature). I examine the phenomenological repercussions of such 
positions for those who find themselves in them. I am also concerned with the narrative 
struggle (that is, the struggle over what constitutes a legitimate narrative), both internal 
and external, which takes place once a person has been thrown into the discursive space 
available to those diagnosed with cancer within a particular socio-cultural context.  
    
Whilst this paper is particularly concerned with the more problematic aspects of the 
discursive construction of being diagnosed with cancer, I do acknowledge that there are 
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also positive (social and psychological) consequences of diagnosis including a sense of 
validation of a complaint once it has been recognised as a legitimate medical condition 
(eg. Lillrank, 2003, with regard to chronic back pain) and access to a collective identity 
and a reduction in social isolation (eg. Chiong, 2001; both of these cited in Jutel, 2009).  
This is particularly the case for those diagnosed with “rare, unfamiliar or ‘poorly 
understood’ disorders” for whom access to and identification with support groups can be 
very helpful (Fleischman, 1999: 18).     
 
 
The Role of  Discourse 
 
The way we talk about something is important because people situate personal 
experiences within a social and discursive context. Discourse constructs the objects and 
subjects of which it speaks; discourses may therefore be defined as “sets of statements 
that construct objects and an array of subject positions” (Parker, 1994: 245). Part of the 
discursive context within which people experience being diagnosed with cancer includes 
increasingly frequent media coverage of cancer ‘survivor stories’ of celebrities and 
ordinary people (see Wray, Marcovic & Manderson, 2007:3 for examples), widely 
available public health/health promotion materials concerned with cancer prevention and 
lifestyle advice (Lupton, 1995) as well as popularizations of scientific articles in the 
media (eg. Williams Camus, 2009).  
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As early as 1977, in Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag (1991) explored the various 
subject positions contained within widely used cancer metaphors (such as cancer as a 
“demonic enemy” which must be fought; p. 59) and their implications for those who are 
captured by them. She observed that “(…) it is hardly possible to take up one’s residence 
in the kingdom of the ill unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been 
landscaped” (1991:3). Sontag argued that giving a disease moral meaning is a punitive 
process which positions those who are diagnosed with the disease as culpable, as tainted, 
as shamed. More recently, Stacey (1997) has presented a comprehensive account of how 
cancer is perceived, experienced and theorised in contemporary society. Unlike Sontag, 
who excluded biomedical discourse from her critical reading, Stacey’s analysis includes 
an examination of alternative/complementary therapy, self-help as well as biomedical 
discourses. Through an exploration of her own experience of being diagnosed with and 
treated for cancer, Stacey demonstrates how various constructions of cancer contained 
within these discourses positioned her and shaped her experiences including her sense of 
self, demonstrating, as she (1997: 28) puts it  “(…) some of the ways in which a person 
with cancer is subject to, if not bombarded with, powerful and contradictory discourses 
about the nature of their illness” and the “confusion and panic” that can result from this. 
In her book, Stacey (1997) offers a commentary on the meanings attributed to cancer by 
the various health and cancer cultures she encountered during her illness. These include i) 
the idea that cancer symbolises something (such as the cancer patient’s inner weakness 
and self-destructiveness), ii) the assumption that cancer is unspeakable and monstrous, 
iii) the belief that a positive attitude makes recovery more likely and that a healthy body 
requires a ‘healthy mind’, iv) the belief that the patient can contribute to the success of 
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their treatment by visualising the destruction of the disease, v) the expectation that the 
patient ought to be(come) an expert on themselves and the new imperatives of the care of 
the self that result from this, vi) the idea that ultimate responsibility for one’s health lies 
with oneself, and finally, vii) the construction of death as unacceptable and a failure 
which ought to be avoided (see Stacey, 1997: 25-28  for a summary).            
   
In what follows, I identify a number of dominant discursive constructions of meaning 
around cancer which those who have been diagnosed with cancer will almost certainly 
encounter and which are therefore likely to mediate the ways in which they are able to 
make sense of their experiences. My discussion draws on my own experience of being 
diagnosed with cancer (Willig, 2009), a range of recently published research papers as 
well as earlier work by Sontag (1991) and Stacey (1997). The phenomenological 
implications of being captured and positioned by these constructions will be explored and 
their social-psychological consequences will be considered. 
 
 
Discursive Constructions of Cancer and Its Meanings 
 
The Cultural Imperative to ‘Think Positively’ 
My own experience of being diagnosed with cancer made me acutely aware of the 
presence of something like a cultural imperative to ‘think positively’. Thinking positively 
means demonstrating faith in the belief that things will turn out well and that every 
problem can be solved. In relation to a cancer diagnosis, it also seems to mean that death 
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as a possible outcome is not to be acknowledged or talked about. I (Willig, 2009: 185) 
soon realised that to acknowledge death as a possible outcome was constructed as a 
morbid preoccupation, as “something unhealthy and illegitimate (or impossible), at least 
while death is a mere possibility rather than a certainty”. Similar observations have been 
made by other authors. In her recent book aptly entitled ‘Smile or Die’, Ehrenreich (2009: 
26) argues that “[E]xhortations to think positively - to see the glass half full, even when it 
lies shattered on the floor (…)” pervade North American culture including ‘breast cancer 
culture’ (Ehrenreich, 2009: 45). She describes how her own experience of being 
diagnosed with and treated for breast cancer made her realise that “[P]ositive thinking 
seems to be mandatory in the breast cancer world, to the point where unhappiness 
requires a kind of apology”. Ehrenreich draws on a wide range of material posted on 
internet-based cancer support group websites as well as other relevant publications (eg. 
first-person accounts, advice leaflets, books about how to live with cancer) in order to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of a cultural imperative to think positively about cancer. 
Within these texts, cancer is constructed as a ‘wake-up call’ to rethink one’s life, an 
opportunity to make a fresh start and to live a better, healthier life as a result. Within this 
context, Ehrenreich (2009: 27-9) cites descriptions of cancer as “a gift” and “the best 
thing that ever happened”. In a much earlier review of research into the social 
expectations encountered by cancer patients, Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter (1979: 134) 
already identified “[T]he assumption that the patient should avoid thinking or talking 
about the negative aspects of his or her situation, and attempt to remain as cheerful and 
optimistic as possible”.              
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Recent research into the social and emotional consequences of word choice (Mosher & 
Danoff-Burg, 2009) demonstrates how the cultural imperative to think positively about 
cancer is reflected in interpretations of linguistic classifications of individuals with 
cancer. Mosher and Dandoff-Burg (2009) found that across two studies which compared  
reactions to the use of the terms ‘cancer survivor’ and ‘cancer patient’, a large sample of 
undergraduate students  attributed consistently more positive qualities to someone 
described as a ‘cancer survivor’ (as opposed to ‘cancer patient’) and they expressed more 
positive attitudes towards them. In the second study, participants also expressed a 
significantly greater willingness to interact with “cancer survivors” than with “cancer 
patients”.  This suggests that a ‘positive’ stance towards having cancer, one which 
focuses upon survival and active living (‘survivor’) as opposed to one which foregrounds 
passivity and suffering (‘patient’), is socially desirable and rewarded. Interestingly, 
Mosher and Dandoff-Burg (2009) cite three recent studies which have found that people 
who are receiving health care themselves actually prefer the label ‘patient’ to alternatives 
such as ‘survivor’ or ‘consumer’ (see Deber et al., 2005; Lloyd, King, Bassett, Sandland 
& Savige, 2001; Nair, 1998).  
 
One way in which the cultural imperative to take a ‘positive’ stance towards having 
cancer manifests itself is through a construction of cancer as war and the widespread use 
of military metaphors which instruct patients to ‘fight their illness’ (see Ross, 1989; 
Lupton, 1994).  Stacey (1997: 172) describes how visualisation as a form of self-healing 
advocated by alternative approaches to cancer treatment involves the mobilisation of 
mental images of “fighting and destruction” whereby “the cells of the immune system 
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and the cancer cells make up opposing armies which will fight until death”. Stacey 
(1997) notes that, somewhat ironically, these metaphorical images are derived from the 
militaristic immune system discourse prevalent in mainstream medicine and based upon 
the medical model.       
Williams Camus (2009) presents a comprehensive analysis of the use of metaphor in 
popularizations of scientific articles on cancer in the English press. ‘Cancer is War’ was 
found to be the most frequently used metaphor, a finding which is supported by earlier 
research (eg. Van Rijn-van Togeren, 1997; Clarke, 1992; Seale, 2001). This construction 
is also something that Sontag’s (1991) early polemic against the use of metaphor in 
cancer discourse identified and challenged. ‘Cancer as War’ constructs cancer as an 
enemy who must be fought at all costs and by any means necessary. It instructs patients 
to not give up the fight, positioning the body as a battlefield upon which the struggle 
between life and death is fought. Collateral damage (to the body, to the patient) is to be 
expected and must be accepted as an inevitable part of this process. Soldierly bravery and 
stoic acceptance together with an optimistic attitude and a belief in one’s ability to ‘win 
the battle’ are required and expected. The desirability of ‘positive thinking’ is implied by 
the construction of cancer as war since it is assumed that if the patient shows enough 
determination to win and fights hard enough they can win the war. ‘Not giving up’ is 
valued more highly than any other stance within this context. Obituaries and other 
references to cancer-related deaths in the media demonstrate this by almost inevitably  
constructing the death as a casualty of a ‘battle with cancer’. It seems as though it is not 
acceptable to simply die of cancer- one must first ‘do battle’ with it 1.    
                                                 
1
 Within this context it is interesting to observe that in the opening paragraph of a newspaper article about 
the death of  the actor Lynn Redgrave (The Guardian, Tuesday 4th May 2010, p. 3) the actor is described as 
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Another way in which ‘positive thinking’ manifests itself in cancer discourse is through 
the construction of cancer as a problem to be solved. Here, cancer is constructed as a 
challenge to the human intellect and to science which can potentially be tackled. 
Williams Camus’ (2009) analysis of popularizations of scientific articles in the British 
press identified the repeated use of metaphorical themes such as ‘cancer is  a puzzle’, 
‘cancer is a riddle’, ‘cancer is a tangle’ and ‘cancer is an enigma in a detective story’  
(Williams Camus, 2009: 480-3). These metaphors invoke an optimistic narrative which 
implies that progress is continuously being made and that discovering a cure for cancer is 
only a matter of time because every problem has a solution- it just needs to be found. As 
with the other constructions of cancer which mobilise a discourse of ‘positive thinking’, 
the construction of cancer as a problem to be solved means that staying with the 
experience of cancer and attempting to relate to it as it is are not an option. All of these 
constructions imply that cancer can and must not be accepted- it must be fought, solved 
or otherwise changed into something else, something more benevolent and something 
which removes its association with death. 
 
Cancer as a Moral Concern 
My own experience of other people’s reactions to my cancer diagnosis included an 
encounter with the construction of cancer as a moral concern (Willig, 2009). It seemed as 
though my diagnosis called for an explanation which positioned me at the centre of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
having “died aged 67 after a lengthy battle with cancer” which is followed, in paragraph three, by a citation 
of the family’s  own official statement which read “Our beloved mother Lynn Rachel passed away 
peacefully after a seven-year journey with breast cancer”. It seems that the construction of ‘cancer as war’ 
is so ubiquitous that even the family’s own alternative construction of ‘cancer as a journey’ has not deterred 
the author of the article from invoking the compulsory “battle”.  
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action. Once identified as a cancer patient, my lifestyle seemed to become a legitimate 
subject of interest and I was asked questions about what I might have been doing to bring 
cancer into my life (eg. was I still smoking ? Had I been sunbathing too much ? Was I 
eating a balanced diet ?). Both Stacey (1997) and Ehrenreich (2009) observe similar 
attributions of responsibility contained within contemporary cancer discourse. Stacey 
(1997) reviews both relevant literature and her own experience of a range of alternative 
treatment approaches to cancer, noting that cancer is frequently constructed as a sign of 
degeneration, corruption and decay, indicative of the cancer patient’s inner weakness and 
self-destructiveness. She argues that a contemporary “model of cancer as a disease 
‘occasioned’ by the self” (p. 175) is the product of a combination of current beliefs about 
the aetiology of cancer (eg. that it is ‘home grown’, the product of spontaneous cell 
growth; the role of lifestyle and behavioural factors), popular mind/body metaphors 
associated with complementary medicine and ‘New Age’ thinking (eg. the idea that a 
healthy body is the external manifestation of a healthy mind) and militarised immune 
system discourse (eg. the image of the immune system as the body’s army trained to fight 
foreign invasion which, in the case of cancer, has failed to recognise an  internal enemy 
bent on self-destruction). The result is a construction of cancer as the patient’s own 
creation and, therefore, ultimately their responsibility. One implication of this is the 
expectation that the cancer patient ought to accept this responsibility and declare 
ownership of “their” cancer. Within this context, references to cancer as a “wake-up call” 
are common (Willig, 2009; Ehrenreich, 2009), implying that preceding their diagnosis the 
cancer patient had been lax and inattentive regarding their self-care and that the cancer 
diagnosis had been necessary to awaken them from their complacent state of disregard 
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for their own health. High levels of vigilance and responsible behaviour are expected of 
the patient once a diagnosis of cancer has been made. Stacey (1997) draws a link between 
this moral positioning of the cancer patient and a new form of moral citizenship 
associated with what has been described as a new ‘imperative of  health’ (Lupton, 1994) 
and a remoralisation of health in the late twentieth century (Gillick, 1984).   
        
The Body as Object 
My own experience of being diagnosed with cancer changed my relationship with my 
body which seemed to lose its status of being the self’s ally to becoming its enemy. I 
described how my self “(…) began to feel like a hostage, at the mercy of a damaged 
container that may self-destruct and destroy my ‘self’ along with it” (Willig, 2009: 186). I 
experienced my (healthy) self as very much separate from my (diseased) body, and yet 
this separation was a fragile state of affairs which required much mental effort to sustain. 
Any encounters with constructions of the body as an independent entity with its own 
inner workings and mechanisms beyond the control of the self felt unsettling and 
threatening to me. I noticed that conversations about ‘my body’ and what was happening 
within ‘it’ made me feel strangely excluded and invisible, as though my body was taking 
over and my sense of self was (at risk of being) lost. It has been proposed that modern 
medical technologies which produce ‘objective’ representations of the body and which 
form the basis of diagnostic and treatment-related decisions, contribute to a 
preoccupation with the ‘disease’ (e. the identification of objective disease markers in the 
body) at the expense of the ‘illness’ (ie. the experiential dimension of ill health), 
reflecting and enhancing the disease orientation of medical language (see McCullough, 
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1989) . As a result, it is argued, “[T]echnological representations hide the selves 
embedded in human bodies, reinforcing the already alienating effect of hospital 
medicine” (Blaxter, 2009: 763). However, Blaxter (2009) suggests that the way in which 
such representations are recorded, interpreted and used (and the extent to which the 
patient is actively involved in this process) can moderate the degree of alienation. In her 
analysis of popularizations of scientific articles about cancer in the British press Williams 
Camus (2009: 473-5) identifies the widespread use of the construction of ‘cancer as 
machine’ which she links with the wider ‘body as machine’ metaphor whereby the body 
is constructed as being made up of parts with different functions which together allow the 
machine to function and ‘do its job’. ‘Cancer as a machine’ constructs cancer as a faulty 
mechanism which interferes with the smooth running of the body-machine. Williams 
Camus (2009:475) notes that this metaphor has been criticised for dehumanising the 
patient (eg. Stibbe, 1998; Coulehan, 2003; Fleischman, 2001) by excluding the 





Having sketched the discursive context within which those diagnosed with cancer are 
positioned, I want to go on to explore some of the social and psychological repercussions 
of this positioning. I want to move from the discursive to the phenomenological by 
making links between the discursive positions available to cancer patients and the 
experiential world(s) they may give rise to. The second half of this paper is, therefore, 
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concerned with experience: what is it like to be captured by dominant constructions of 
cancer and how may available subject positions shape the experience of being diagnosed 
with cancer ? 
The discursive constructions identified above (the cultural imperative to ‘think 
positively’; cancer as a moral concern; the body as object) each foreground particular 
dimensions of meaning around which the experience of being diagnosed with cancer is 
organised. At the same time, they obscure or exclude others. This has implications for 
how a cancer diagnosis can be experienced and for what is seen (and experienced) as a 
‘legitimate’ way of being a cancer patient. The following discussion explores some of the 
repercussions of the discursive constructions identified earlier for cancer patients’ ability 
to engage with suffering and mortality, for their experience of  managing responsibility 
and for coping with alienation.  
 
Engaging with suffering and mortality  
The cultural imperative to ‘think positively’ foregrounds the patient’s responsibility to do 
all s/he can to regain health. It privileges a ‘restitution narrative’ (Frank, 1995) which 
constructs illness as a temporary interruption of the ‘normal’ state of being which is 
health. This means that acceptance (of illness, of suffering, of mortality) is not a 
legitimate way of finding meaning in a cancer diagnosis. The cultural imperative to ‘think 
positively’ constructs acceptance as ‘giving up’ and it taints the patient who chooses to 
accept their fate with the undesirable qualities of the deserting soldier, the one who 
surrenders, who lacks the moral courage to continue to fight the enemy. Staying with the 
experience of suffering and finding meaning within it, without attempting to make it go 
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away, is not a socially acceptable option. Experientially, this also means that coming to 
terms with mortality, “making peace with death”, as van Deurzen (1998: 12) puts it, is 
not encouraged and the patient who wishes to engage with their mortality will struggle to 
find a social space within which to do so. It also means that those whose cancer is clearly 
terminal find themselves excluded from the dominant narrative (restitution) at a time 
when emotional and social support is most needed. Finding meaning in their experience 
is likely to become a major challenge when the dominant narrative fails to make sense. At 
the same time, the cultural imperative to ‘think positively’ implies that a ‘negative’ 
outcome (such as death) is simply too terrifying to contemplate and that, therefore, it 
must be denied until the last possible moment. This is likely to increase the fear of death 
and it means that those who have reached the point where ‘positive thinking’ does not 
make sense anymore may find themselves unprepared and very much alone in finally 
confronting their mortality.    
 
Managing responsibility  
The cultural imperative to ‘think positively’ instructs those diagnosed with cancer to fight 
back and not give up. It positions the patient as active agent in the cancer drama and it 
attributes ultimate responsibility to the patient for the outcome of their battle where, 
morally speaking, not giving up is as highly valued as winning (as demonstrated by the 
obligatory reference to the ‘battle with cancer’ in obituaries and media reports of cancer-
related deaths). Similarly, the construction of ‘cancer as a moral concern’ also positions 
the patient at the centre of events. This time, responsibility is attributed retrospectively, 
by scrutinizing the patient’s psychological make-up and lifestyle in the search for 
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aetiological factors. Foregrounding the patient’s individual responsibility for ‘their 
cancer’ leads to what Ehrenreich (2009: 43) describes as ‘victim-blaming’ which “(…) 
can weigh on a cancer patient like a second disease”. In addition, it can also divert 
attention from the role of external factors (such as environmental pollution or lack of 
speedy access to screening and medical treatments) in cancer aetiology and mortality. As 
Stacey (1997: 175) points out the construction of cancer as “a disease ‘occasioned’ by the 
self” implicates the very core of the cancer patient’s identity, their character and 
personality, in the aetiology of the disease. This means that it can be difficult for the 
patient to separate ‘self’ and ‘disease’ leading to a sense of overall corruption and 
inadequacy. The malaise then transcends the medical frame of reference and begins to 
require moral adjustments, the first of which is the acceptance of responsibility for the 
disease, followed by the promise to heed the ‘wake-up call’ and to change one’s ways. 
Experientially, this means that for the cancer patient to gain social approval, s/he needs to 
reject his/her former self and to engage in a process of moral renewal. Refusal to do this 
may mean losing social support and missing out on empathy.   
 
Coping with alienation      
Constructions of ‘the body as object’, akin to a piece of equipment or a mechanical 
contraption, conceive of the body as an entity entirely separate from the self. This is not 
the body as the locus of subjective experience or the embodiment of personhood. Rather 
‘the body as object’ is the non-human, material part of the Cartesian body-mind duality. 
Within the context of cancer diagnosis, a construction of ‘the body as object’ positions 
the self as being  trapped within, and therefore at the mercy of, the diseased body, of what 
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I have described as a “damaged container” (Willig, 2009:186). By conceptually 
separating the body from the self, the self loses control over the body and this becomes a 
frightening prospect once the body itself is diseased.  This is particularly poignant within 
the context of cancer which, as Stacey (1997: 79) points out,  “(…) is widely understood 
as a disease of uncontrolled cell growth”. An alienated body out of control constitutes a 
direct threat to the integrity and survival of the self. Experientially, this means that when 
the body becomes the object (of the medical gaze, of conversations about disease 
progression, of technological representations) the patient’s self is under siege and at risk 
of being lost. Since within the dualistic model the patient’s humanity is located within the 
self, a preoccupation with the diseased body and its faulty mechanisms can also engender 
a sense of being dehumanised, that is to say, a sense of not being related to as a person.             
Martial cancer metaphors (discussed earlier within the context of the cultural imperative 
to ‘think positively’) which construct cancer as a formidable enemy which has invaded 
and colonised the body and which must be fought by any means necessary also draw on 
constructions of ‘the body as object’. In this case, the body, again dehumanised, is 
constructed as the battleground upon which the war against cancer must be fought and 
where collateral damage is an inevitability. The cancer patient as a person is separated 
from their body which itself becomes the enemy since the cancer resides within the 
body’s own cells. Chemotherapy, its toxic effects and the suffering this occasions for the 
patient illustrates the ambiguous status of the patient’s body within the ‘war on cancer’. 
Experientially, this means that the patient’s relationship with their own body is likely to 
be ambivalent as it is not obvious to what extent the body is an ally and to what extent it 
is the enemy (see also Williams Camus, 2009, for a discussion of the social psychological 
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consequences of martial cancer metaphors). In addition, the patient’s physical needs as a 
person (eg. for physical closeness to others, for physical intimacy) can easily disappear 
from view when the body becomes a battlefield and the patient may feel that a desire for 
physical comfort and human contact is inappropriate and needs to be suppressed, 
particularly during treatment. 
 
Taken together, an exploration of the phenomenological implications of being 
positioned within dominant discursive constructions of cancer suggests that 
engaging with suffering and mortality, managing responsibility and coping with 
alienation may constitute particular challenges for those diagnosed with cancer. It 
is interesting to note that in an early paper on the interpersonal environment of 
cancer patients, Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter (1979) identified a number of 
barriers to receiving validation and support from others which echo some of the 
observations made in this paper. They note that there is a large body of evidence 
which demonstrates that cancer patients encounter considerable difficulties in 
their relations with others as a result of their diagnosis. Wortman and Dunkel-
Schetter (1979) develop a model of the interpersonal environment of cancer 
patients which attempts to trace the social processes by which cancer patients 
receive responses from others that are “ inconsistent, confusing and ultimately 
destructive” (p.124).  In particular, Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter (1979) draw 
attention to widespread beliefs about the need to display optimism and 
cheerfulness when in the presence of a cancer patient. This attitude is difficult to 
sustain in the face of suffering and distress and, they argue, that it can lead to 
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behaviours such as physical avoidance of the patient, avoidance of open 
communication, and a range of discrepant, contradictory behaviours. In addition, 
Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter (1979) identify the tendency to believe in a ‘just 
world’ (Lerner, 1970) where people get what they deserve, leading to individual 
attributions of responsibility for contracting cancer. In this way, the authors argue, 
those close to the cancer patient can protect themselves from the fear of 
contracting cancer themselves as this would constitute ‘undeserved suffering’, 
leading to a further distancing from the cancer patient and their experience of 
living with cancer.  
 
 
The Struggle for Meaning  
 
Although much of what has been discussed in this paper so far has been concerned with 
the experience of being positioned within dominant cancer discourses in general (rather 
than the process of being diagnosed with cancer in particular), I want to argue that these 
general positionings and their phenomenological and social repercussions are intimately 
bound up with, and indeed dependent upon, the social process of diagnosis. Diagnosis 
marks the moment when a set of  phenomena (such as an array of signs and/or symptoms, 
a series of test results, episodes of ill health) are transformed into disease categories. Such 
categories constitute medical interpretations of experiential and social phenomena, and 
they usually offer both aetiological as well as prognostic meanings which organise the 
illness experience including treatment options and procedures. A diagnosis also carries 
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moral connotations particularly in relation to aetiology (eg. to what extent is the patient 
responsible for ‘bringing on’ the condition ?) and contagion (eg. is the patient responsible 
for containing the disease ?) Diagnostic categories, once applied to a person, position 
them as a ‘patient’ and as a ‘sufferer’ of the pathological condition that has been 
diagnosed. Diagnosis, therefore, marks the moment when the individual is inserted into 
the discursive field associated with the diagnosis they have received. Fleischman (1999: 
10) draws attention to the “transformative power” which medical language has over 
patients whereby, 
 
“[I]f a person is told ‘you have cancer’ (or any life-threatening disease) these 
words irrevocably alter that person’s consciousness, view of the future, 
relationship with family and friends, and so on” (italics in original).  
 
Fleischman (1999) illustrates the significance of language and the choice of words within 
this context by contrasting the various alternative diagnostic labels which have been used 
to refer to the set of symptoms which constitute the rare blood disorder Fleischman 
herself has been diagnosed with. These labels include ‘refractory anaemia’, 
‘preleukaemic disorder’ and (the currently preferred) ‘myelodyplastic syndromes’, 
amongst others. Fleischman notes that each of these labels constructs the haematological 
pathology in a different way, foregrounding different aspects of the condition, with the 
reference to ‘pre-leukaemia’ constructing a particularly threatening version of it. 
Diagnosis initiates the struggle for meaning, both internally (ie. What does it mean to me 
to have been diagnosed with cancer ? Who am I now and how will I live ?) and externally 
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(ie. How do others see me now that I am ‘a cancer patient’ ? How will I be positioned in 
relation to (healthy) others and what role can I play socially, now that I have been 
diagnosed with cancer ?). It also provides some of the discursive resources with which 
meaning can be made, and it limits and constrains the meanings which can be constructed 
by the individual. As Fleischman (1999: 13) puts it, 
 
“For the afflicted individual, illness becomes a trope for new attitudes toward the 
self; it also influences perceptions of that self by others (…) if the diagnosis is 
refractory anemia  the impact on all concerned is dramatically different from a 
diagnosis of preleukemia” (italics in original).        
 
The struggle for meaning after a cancer diagnosis is challenging and it can be painful. In 
what follows, I reflect on the experience of being inserted into cancer discourse, its 
emotional quality and the importance of the socio-cultural and historical context within 
which it takes place.  
 
The experience of being constructed by and positioned within cancer discourse 
Both Stacey (1997) and Ehrenreich (2009) powerfully evoke the sense of vulnerability 
and mortification that accompanies the experience of being constructed by and positioned 
within dominant cancer discourses. Both authors communicate a sense of loss of control  
over the story that they can tell about themselves and a struggle to regain control over the 
narrative which will, eventually, make sense of their experience of being diagnosed with 
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cancer. Similarly, in my own account of the struggle for meaning during the process of 
cancer diagnosis (Willig, 2009: 182) I observed that, 
 
“(…) I also realised that, in this situation of uncertainty, when feeling anxious 
and vulnerable, other people’s comments and observations (and the discourses of 
health and illness which they evoked) had a great impact on me. At times, it felt 
like I had to actively ‘defend myself’ against proffered meanings, which, to me, 
seemed unhelpful or even destructive”.    
 
Likewise, in her reflections on her experience of being diagnosed with a rare and life-
threatening blood disorder, Fleischman (1999: 7) observes, 
 
“When the body is seriously out of kilter, particularly if the condition is likely to 
endure, your sensitivity to the nuances of words used to describe it is inevitably 
heightened. You become critically aware of the subtle ways in which lexical 
choices define you as a person”. 
   
It seems that at a time when narrative wreckage threatens, when an existing storyline 
ceases to make sense of our current experience, we are particularly vulnerable to what 
Frank (1995: 6) has described as ‘narrative surrender’. Being diagnosed with cancer 
requires adjustments and modifications to one’s sense of self – for example, by 
incorporating a stronger awareness of mortality, of physical and/or psychological 
vulnerability or by changing one’s relationship with one’s body. Finding bearable 
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meaning in a cancer diagnosis and coming to terms with its implications for one’s sense 
of self is not easy, particularly whilst powerful messages from loved ones and the wider 
society about what it means to be a ‘cancer patient’ are received at the same time. 
 In their interview study of 19 female breast cancer patients’ experiences of the impact of 
an altered appearance during chemotherapy treatment, Harcourt and Frith (2008) 
identified two key themes within the data: i) anxiety that chemotherapy would render 
them identifiable as a ‘person-with-cancer’, and ii) problematic interactions with others. 
In particular, the loss of hair (including any attempts to disguise this, for example, by 
wearing a headscarf or a wig) was feared as it was seen to impart information about their 
disease status to others and, therefore, to lead to them being identifiable as a ‘person-
with-cancer’. Such an identification, in turn, led to a loss of control over how to define 
oneself and over how one was treated by others (eg. with unwanted attention, with 
sympathy or pity when they just wanted to ‘blend in’, with unwanted advice or 
unsolicited opinions about the causes of cancer). In other words, participants feared and 
experienced a loss of control over who they were and who they could be within a social 
context. For some participants, their attempts to regain control led them to avoid social 
interactions, thus echoing Wortman and Dunkel-Schetter’s (1979) concerns about cancer 
patients’ social withdrawal. Being identifiable as a ‘person-with-cancer’ was experienced 
as stigmatising and the visible signs of being treated for cancer exposed them to invasions 
of privacy (cf. Goffman, 1963), a phenomenon which was also identified in a study of the 
experiences of women with gynaecological cancer (Wray, Markovic and Maderson, 
2007) 2.  
                                                 
2
 Phenomenologically speaking, the experience of stigma and the consequent invasions of privacy can 
engender a sense of shame. Being seen (for example, as marked by the outward signs of cancer treatment) 
 25 
 
The (social, historical, cultural) context in which meaning is made  
It is important to acknowledge that the struggle for meaning after cancer diagnosis 
always takes place within a very specific socio-historical and cultural context. Such a 
context makes certain discourses more or less available, it foregrounds particular 
constructions of meaning and it obscures others. Fleischman (1999) draws attention to 
role of language in this and she reminds us that languages differ with regard to the lexical 
and grammatical options they make available in order to construct meaning around the 
experience of health and illness. For example, languages differ in the way in which they 
construct the relationship between a person and their illness whereby some languages 
allow for the possibility of an existential identification with one’s health problem (eg. by 
saying ‘I am a diabetic’) whereas others do not, instead preferring a subject-object split 
between person and disease (eg. by using the construction ‘I have diabetes’). In addition, 
in most languages and cultures, the body and its various constitutive parts take on 
symbolic meanings, acting as metaphors for mental and physical states and conditions 
(eg. in English, ‘blood’ signifies transmission of qualities or characteristics via the notion 
of lineage as well as of contagion) which are activated when a body part or organ is 
diagnosed with a pathology. This means that, as Fleischman (1999:21) puts it,  
                                                                                                                                                 
and categorised (in this case, as a cancer patient) can lead to a feeling of being trapped within a spoilt 
identity which foregrounds undesirable and morally dubious personal attributes (such as lack of courage 
and self-destructiveness, as discussed in an earlier section of this paper). In his discussion of ‘being-for-
others’, the social dimension of his phenomenological ontology, Sartre (2003) identifies the moment when 
we experience being seen by another person as the moment when we become aware of ourselves as an 
object within the other’s world. This moment is characterised by “the shock which seizes me when I 
apprehend the Other’s look” and the realisation that “(…) the Other is the hidden death of my possibilities” 
(Sartre, 2003: 288). This is because the other’s look expresses the fact that it is him/her, not me, who gives 
meaning to the object which I constitute in his/her world. Shame ensues when we experience ourselves as 
the object which the other is looking at and judging. Through ‘the look’ we are trapped in the other’s world 
and have to live with the consequences. Sartre (2003: 286) implicitly invokes the role of discourse in this 




“When you contract a disease, you contact with it the world of that disease, 
including all its affective and culture-specific meanings, which are frequently 
symbolic or metaphorical”. 
 
Other authors, such as Ehrenreich (2009) and Klawiter (2004), have drawn attention to 
the role of the wider socio-cultural and ideological contexts which mediate the 
experiences of those diagnosed with cancer by making available particular socially and 
culturally specific disease regimes. Ehrenreich (2009) describes a US American ideology 
of ‘positive thinking’ fuelled and sustained by underlying economic interests. Such an 
ideology foregrounds individual responsibility (for health, for success, for employment, 
for access to opportunities) and elides the influence of corporate forces and the political 
economy. Such an ideology constructs breast cancer as an opportunity to demonstrate 
one’s superior personal qualities including optimism, resourcefulness and resilience but 
does not allow for expressions of anger, sadness or hopelessness, and it does not 
encourage political action to tackle the environmental causes of increasing rates of breast 
cancer in the USA.  
Klawiter (2004) traces changes over time in the availability of illness experiences as they 
are shaped by social movements. In her analysis of one woman’s narrative of being 
diagnosed with breast cancer twice, first in 1979 and again in 1997, she demonstrates 
how changes in breast cancer regimes (including institutionalised practices, authoritative 
discourses, social relations, collective identities, emotional vocabularies, visual images, 
public policies and regulatory actions), facilitated by movements of breast cancer 
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activism in the 1990s in the San Francisco Bay Area, made available two very different 
illness experiences at these two points in time. Whilst the woman’s experience in 1979 
was characterised by the sovereign power of physicians, isolation and disempowerment 
of patients, gender- and hetero-normative assumptions about female embodiment, the 
invisibility of women with breast cancer and the lack of a group identity, her experience 
in 1997 offered a very different illness experience involving a more egalitarian 
relationship between patients and physicians, involvement of a wide variety of support 
staff, expansion of access to medical information, participation in medical decision-
making, new specialist social services and resources, a growing visibility of women with 
breast cancer, new collective identities and the presence of a multi-stranded breast cancer 
movement. Whilst the woman’s initial experience of breast cancer was “relentlessly 
individualised” and characterised by “stigma, isolation and invisibility” (Klawiter, 2004: 
865-6), the second regime of breast cancer had reframed the disease allowing her to 
experience herself as a participating, visible, supported and respected cancer patient. 
Klawiter (2004: 866) concludes that localised, historically specific ‘regimes of disease’ 
shape illness experiences and that an understanding of such regimes of practices 
“enhances our ability to historicise and contextualise the structural shaping of illness 
experience”.          
What is striking about the analysis of cancer discourse presented in this paper is the 
relentless and unforgiving individualism which characterises the positionings made 
available to those diagnosed with cancer within the various constructions of cancer 
identified here. From the assumption that the individual’s commitment to his/her ‘battle 
against cancer’ can make the difference between life and death, to the notion of cancer as 
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a disease occasioned by the self in the first place, attributions of individual responsibility 
for cancer abound. This reflects the foregrounding of the individual citizen and their 
rights and responsibilities (as opposed to the role of collectivities and the political 
economy) characteristic of a worldview shaped by capitalist principles in general and,  
more recently, by neo-liberal ideologies in particular (eg. Stephenson and Papadopoulos, 
2006). There is also evidence of a preoccupation with control and the assumption that 
gaining control over events by shaping them and, ideally, directing them is always 
desirable. By contrast, accepting what is happening and staying with an experience 
(rather than trying to control or change it) is not presented as a legitimate option. Such an 
orientation reflects Western values, in particular those associated with scientific progress 
and human control of the natural environment. It is particularly interesting to note that 
what may be described as ‘alternative’ cancer treatments associated with ‘New Age’ 
thinking construct the person with cancer in ways that are just as strongly shaped by 
Western capitalist ideologies as are the more mainstream, medicalised approaches (see 





In this paper I have attempted to integrate discursive and phenomenological perspectives 
by exploring the implications of discursive constructions of cancer and the positionings 
made available by them for the lived experience of those diagnosed with cancer. Drawing 
on my own experience as well as recently published analyses of cancer discourse, I have 
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mapped out some of the dominant constructions of cancer and I have explored the ways 
in which these foreground, and indeed privilege, particular versions of the cancer 
experience. The cultural imperative to ‘think positively’, moral connotations of cancer as 
a disease occasioned by the self (cf. Stacey, 1997), and a construction of the body as not 
fully human and distinct from the self emerged as the central discursive structures 
identified in contemporary cancer discourse . I have reflected on what it may be like to be 
diagnosed with cancer within this discursive field, proposing that the positionings on 
offer would make it difficult to engage with suffering and mortality, that they would 
place the burden of responsibility for their cancer and its progress (or otherwise) upon the 
individual, and that there would be a sense of alienation (from one’s body and from other 
people). I have also drawn attention to the relationship between available cancer 
discourses and practices (‘cancer regimes’, as Klawiter, 2004, puts it) and the specific 
socio-historical and cultural context within which a person experiences a cancer 
diagnosis. A pervasive individualism and the imperative to take (and maintain) control 
over events were identified as important ingredients of cancer discourse, demonstrating a 
link between cancer discourse and the wider social-political and ideological context 
within which it is produced.   
From a methodological point of view, my argument has been that an understanding of the 
discursive context within which people experience a cancer diagnosis can enhance our 
understanding of the experience itself (see also Willig, 2000; Willig, in press). The 
publication of personal narratives of illness experiences including critical reflection on 
the social and discursive contexts within which these experiences have taken place (eg. 
Blaxter, 2009; Ehrenreich, 2009; Frank, 1991, 1995; Fleischman, 1999; Stacey, 1997) has 
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greatly contributed to our understanding of how illness experience is mediated. Such 
accounts demonstrate just how powerful the (social and psychological) effects of being 
positioned within dominant illness discourses can be and how strongly they influence our 
relations with other people and, indeed, with ourselves. Diagnosis, as the moment when 
we are thrown into a new discursive field (within which we will have to survive, socially 
and psychologically, from then on) is an essential part of the process of being captured by 
dominant constructions (of cancer, of illness). As such, personal accounts of coming to 
terms with being positioned within cancer discourse contribute significantly to the 
development of a sociology of diagnosis. Further research into the interplay between 
discourse and experience in relation to illness will expand this field and help us to 
develop both the theory and practice of diagnosis.   
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